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ABSTRACT
On two-sided peer-to-peer platforms there exists a supply side (producers) and a
demand side (consumers). Platform owners provide the platforms that assist in efficiently
matching producers and consumers and an infrastructure that producers can take
advantage of to signal quality to consumers. This study examines the effects of producer
signals on product performance in the context of Airbnb, a peer-to-peer home sharing
platform. Adjusting for producers with multiple listings, the analysis uses 77,445 listings
from the platform to produce regression models which tests whether signals are positively
related to product performance and if the relationship between producer signals and
product performance is moderated by product type. Results show that while producer
signals are important to product performance, there is minimal support for the assumption
that signals vary by product type. Results also show that certain product attributes may be
more important than producer signals in some contexts. Based on these findings, business
and theoretical implications are discussed as well as directions for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
From transportation to daily errands, many aspects of life have been transformed
by the emergence of the sharing economy and the peer-to-peer platforms that inhabit it.
The sharing economy is defined as a market for accessing products and services on a
temporary basis rather than owning them (Puschmann & Alt, 2016). Peer-to-peer (P2P)
platforms play an important role in this market, connecting supply- and demand-side
participants (i.e. platform producers and consumers). These platforms often disrupt or
change traditional industries like rental/hospitality services, taxi services, car rentals, and
even lending (Ryu et al., 2019). This change in consumer behavior is facilitated and
amplified by evolving social networks and electronic markets (i.e. P2P
platforms).(Puschmann & Alt, 2016).
A key aspect of the value that peer-to-peer platform owners create for customers
is the efficiency with which they match supply with demand (Morse, 2015). For example,
a 2016 analysis shows that, on average, Uber drivers achieve more capacity utilization
than taxi drivers in major United States cities. One reason for Uber drivers’ superior
performance is the presence of the Uber platform, which provides an efficient matching
tool (Cramer & Krueger, 2016). On platforms like eBay, Prosper, and Airbnb where
consumers and producers are not automatically matched, the platforms provide a space
for producers to communicate quality, competence, and trustworthiness. Thus, signaling
theory is used in recent literature to understand the importance of signaling producer
quality in order to improve product performance.
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Recent P2P platform studies simply use product prominence (number of reviews)
as a marker of performance (Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). However, a
more comprehensive assessment of product performance on P2P platforms based on
consumer evaluations of products and producers has received relatively less scholarly
attention. By measuring product performance with both review quality and review
volume, this study improves the state of P2P platform literature and provides a more
robust assessment of performance. Taeuscher (2019) finds that a product’s perceived
quality and prominence positively impacts sales performance. This is proposed to occur
because product quality and product prominence are reputation signals that make it easier
for consumers to have confidence in the products they are pursuing (Taeuscher, 2019).
Specifically, rating scores and rating volume are markers of perceived product quality
and product prominence in online markets, respectively (Taeuscher, 2019). Thus, this
study extends prior research by considering the impact of producers’ reputation signals
on both product quality (rating score) and product prominence (number of reviews).
In addition, there lacks an in-depth understanding of the importance and
effectiveness of particular reputation signals by product type. Seminal works on signaling
theory do not fully address the importance of considering the type of product (Akerlof,
1970; Lee et al., 2005). Yet, the performance of different types of products, such as
entire homes or single rooms on Airbnb’s platform, may be influenced by different
reputation signals, and thus require different approaches to marketing. In turn,
understanding the importance of reputation signals by product type has practical
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implications for both platform owners and platform producers. Building on these insights,
this study examines the following research questions:
RQ1: How do platform producers’ reputation signals contribute to the
performance of their products on peer-to-peer platforms?
RQ2: How does product type moderate the relationship between platform
producers’ reputation signals and product performance?
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Two-Sided Peer-to-Peer Platforms
Firms produce goods or services, which they sell to customers to generate revenue
and profits. However, firms operating as platforms rely on platform producers to create
and deliver goods and services (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). At the same time, they do not
directly sell to customers but facilitate the interactions and transactions of platform
producers and consumers (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Such platforms have traditionally
existed in the gaming and payment systems. For example, platform owners like Microsoft
X-Box, Sony Play Station, and Nintendo Wii, must encourage game developers to create
content compatible with their platforms while also encouraging gamers to purchase that
content (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). Similarly, payment system operators must encourage
merchants and cardholders to interact with each other in order to make a profit (Rochet &
Tirole, 2006). In these two-sided markets, platform owners operate as mediators of two
interdependent sides of the market, capturing value from the interactions of platform
producers and consumers (Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Van Alstyne et al., 2016).
Platform owners’ ability to mediate interactions efficiently and at scale, depends
to a large extent on the number of both platform producers and consumers (Van Alstyne
et al., 2016). This is true in many different types of P2P platforms. In P2P lending, the
more lenders there are, the more likely borrowers will get credit. On the other hand, the
more borrowers are present, the more likely a lender will have consumers to lend to at
their desired risk level (Mariotto, 2016). Similarly, Apple’s App Store enables app
developers and app users to connect. The app developers represent the supply side of this

4

two-sided market and the app users represent the demand side. When there are more apps
available via the developers, there are more incentives for app users to use the App Store.
When there are more app users using the App Store, app developers are incentivized to
create appealing apps (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). While speaking of P2P lending,
Mariotto (2016) states, “the higher the number on each side, the higher the probability of
a successful match between a borrower and a lender and the higher the volume of
transactions” (p. 38). This can be generalized to other P2P contexts because in any P2P
context, if the balance of enticing enough supply and demand fails, the entire platform
could fail due to lack of transactions (Rochet & Tirole, 2003).
With an understanding of how platforms work in two-sided markets, it is
important to note there are different types of platforms. The previously mentioned
examples of payment system operators and gaming consoles are innovation platforms.
These platforms provide “technological building blocks” that a producer can build onto in
order to provide for a consumer (Evans & Gawer, 2016:6). Platforms like Airbnb (P2P
home sharing), eBay (P2P e-commerce), Uber (P2P ridesharing), and Prosper (P2P
lending) are transaction platforms (Evans & Gawer, 2016). Transaction platforms, the
focus of this analysis, consist of “a technology, product or service that acts as a conduit
(or intermediary) facilitating exchange or transactions between different users, buyers, or
suppliers” (Evans & Gawer, 2016:9). While transaction facilitation is the central goal of
firms operating transaction platforms, the producers on those platforms are responsible
for communicating trustworthiness and quality to consumers. By using signaling theory,
many researchers have begun to understand how this process works.

5

Signaling Theory
When actors in economic transactions have incomplete information about a
product, the transaction is considered to contain imperfect information (Lee et al., 2005).
Imperfect, or asymmetric, information occurs when one party has more knowledge of a
product’s quality than the other. In a market setting, the party with more knowledge is
usually the producer (Lee et al., 2005), who, if honest, must work to minimize the
information asymmetry. Marketers portray their product and themselves in a way that
encourages purchase (Lee et al., 2005). This process allows consumers to more easily
classify the producer as trustworthy or untrustworthy and evaluate the quality of the
product sold (Lee et al., 2005).
In signaling theory, there exists a signaler, signal, and receiver. The signaler is the
insider who has information about a product, skill, or service that needs to be conveyed to
the receiver (Connelly et al., 2011). These insiders use the information they have to
communicate the quality of their products and distinguish themselves from untrustworthy
merchants (Lee et al., 2005). This information is often communicated in the form of
market signals which transfer information from the producer to the consumer in order to
communicate information about a product (Lee et al., 2005). In this framework,
consumers are receivers who lack the necessary information to judge the quality of what
is being pursued and the receiver uses the aforementioned signals to assist in the
decision-making process (Connelly et al., 2011).
In digital markets, signals are important because the absence of a physical space
between buyer and seller eliminates observable cues like body language gained from in-
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person interactions (Dimoka et al., 2012). Because of the distance between producer and
consumer, the risk of adverse outcomes for the consumer is heightened (Lee et al., 2005).
Thus, the consumer’s burden is that they are in search of quality (Akerlof, 1970). This
uncertainty, presence of risk, and search for quality leads to the necessity of producer
signals.
Signaling in Peer-to-Peer Contexts
Signals are important in peer-to-peer platforms because they are a useful
evaluation tool in many P2P contexts. In P2P crowdfunding, where crowdfunding
platforms bring together entrepreneurs and potential funders, signals help potential
funders evaluate the quality of the projects being proposed (Kromidha & Robson, 2016).
Signals of engagement like updates, comments on the project website, linked friends, and
number of shares are correlates of success on P2P crowdfunding platforms (Kromidha &
Robson, 2016). Also, in order to reduce uncertainty, producers on eBay’s two-sided
market signal credibility and quality by using the platform’s features (Lu et al., 2009).
Some producers engage in the pursuit of eBay promotions for their products in order to
signal to consumers that their products are of quality (Melnik et al., 2011). Those who
signal successfully the high quality of their products can typically charge higher prices
and see better outcomes such as more revenue (Brown, 2015).
In P2P home sharing, homeowners signal trust through reputation signals. Guests
must evaluate these homeowners through signals about their competency and credibility
in order to proceed with a purchase. Guest satisfaction is in part derived by trust
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established through the signals on a homeowner’s profile (Moon et al., 2019). Recently,
trust signals like host locality, superhost status, response rate, length of tenure, and
verification have been used when studying P2P home sharing, particularly on Airbnb
(Xie & Mao, 2017). Specifically, Xie and Mao (2017) find that potential guests use the
previously mentioned signals to judge the quality of hosts, proving trust facilitation
through signals helps foster positive outcomes.
In P2P lending, lenders often have imperfect information about borrowers. This
leads to information asymmetries because a borrower knows their own value and risk
while the lender does not (Mariotto, 2016). Thus, the burden is on the borrower to
convince the lender of their quality in this two-sided P2P market. In P2P lending,
platforms like Prosper and LendingClub use social media-like features in order to aid in
the resolution of information asymmetry (Mariotto, 2016). In this context, a borrowers’
social ties act as a signal of their viability and credit quality (Lin et al., 2013).
Specifically, on the Prosper platform, borrowers with friends on their profile had better
outcomes, especially when those friends came with signals of quality like being a prolific
lender (Lin et al., 2013). Another signal of credibility in this context includes borrower
history, which helps lenders navigate a space in which information is scarce and risk is
high (Cai et al., 2016).
Whether participating in P2P lending, crowdfunding, or home sharing, those with
imperfect information consistently seek signals to aid in decreasing information
asymmetry and decision making. When these signals are properly used, research shows
that outcomes on the supply side of these two-sided markets are typically more positive.
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Signaling theory poses that signals communicated by producers impact consumer
behavior by reducing uncertainty and signaling quality (Lee et al., 2005). Those who
perform well on platform enabled signals typically have better product performance
outcomes (Brown, 2015). Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H1: Producers’ reputation signals have a positive relationship with product
performance.
Product Type
Through the previously mentioned examples, it is clear there exists a variety of
producer signals, some of which are platform specific. Because of this, producer signal
importance may depend on the types of products offered on platforms. Studies on market
segmentation on P2P platforms show that certain classes of products draw in certain
customers. The simplest example comes from an e-commerce context where producers’
use of different promotional tools for new and used items suggests their awareness of
potential differences in marketing different types of product (Melnik et al., 2011).
Examples that include varying levels of physical risk based on product type come from
ridesharing and home sharing contexts.
Ridesharing platforms such as Uber and Lyft, allow producers to offer different
types of products. Uber Pool and Lyft Shared (formerly Lyft Line) are available as
flexible, budget-friendly options that allow users to share rides with others (Pratt et al.,
2019; Sarriera et al., 2017; Tell, 2015). For riders who want an elevated experience with
increased privacy, Uber X and Lyft Lux may be the preferred option (Pratt et al., 2019).
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On home sharing platforms, consumers typically have the option of choosing a
shared room or an entire home. Shared rooms typically cater to less formal consumers
who are more likely to be men, low income, less concerned with cleanliness, traveling
alone or with a large group (as opposed to with a partner), and most importantly, open to
social interaction (Lutz & Newlands, 2018). Entire home consumers are typically high
income and highly educated individuals more likely to be traveling with a partner or
spouse and more likely to be uncomfortable with social interaction (Lutz & Newlands,
2018). Thus, shared rooms have an increased risk due to the presence of other consumers
renting the same space, while entire homes contain less risk due to the privacy
guaranteed.
If different parts of the demand side of two-sided markets tend to select different
products, we can expect producer signals to have different relationships with product
performance based on the product. The mentioned examples show how high-risk
products may contrast with low-risk products that are meant for consumers looking for a
more formal experience or willing to spend more. Logically, the higher the physical risk
consumers face while using a product, the more assurances they need that the risks will
not materialize, and the more they may depend more on producer signals to relieve their
concerns. As a result, the relationship between producer signals and product performance
is expected to be stronger for high-risk products. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H2: Consumers’ physical risk positively moderates the relationship between
producer signals and performance.
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DATA AND METHODS
Data
To examine how producer signals contribute to product performance and how
different types of products influence the relationship between producer signals and
product performance, this study uses data from Airbnb, a P2P home sharing platform.
Airbnb allows homeowners to rent out their spaces to travelers/guests (Moon et al.,
2019). Due to its success and large data footprint, Airbnb has been the focal point of
those studying P2P platforms and the sharing economy. On Airbnb, typically the
producer (also known as the host) is a person, rather than a company, however property
management companies are joining the platform as well (Cox, 2019). This P2P model in
which guests do not interact with formal hospitality workers or well-known chains has
been the subject of many recent works that focus primarily on the relationship between
hosts, who share their spaces, and guests, who rent out those spaces.
Specifically, the data come from Inside Airbnb, a non-profit originally put forth
to understand the impact of Airbnb on neighborhoods (Cox, 2019). Inside Airbnb
accumulates Airbnb’s publicly available data, which contain consumer ratings, consumer
reviews, host information, and listing information (Cox, 2019). Recently, this dataset has
been used for academic studies that focus on topics relevant to P2P platforms and the
sharing economy (e.g. Xie & Mao, 2017; Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018;
Zhao & Rahman, 2019).
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Because of how Inside Airbnb collects listings, not all cities in the United States
are represented. However, based on Teubner (2018)’s methodology, this selection of
cities and their surrounding metropolitan areas accounts for at least 25% of the United
States population (over 80 million people). This analysis includes seven more cities than
Teubner (2018)’s analysis to increase regional diversity and nationwide generalizability.
Specifically, this analysis focuses on listings from 23 locations in the United States,
which cover a total of 232,347 listings in Asheville, Austin, Boston, Broward County (Ft.
Lauderdale, FL), Cambridge, Chicago, Clark County (Las Vegas, NV), Columbus,
Denver, Los Angeles, Nashville, New Jersey (statewide), New Orleans, New York City,
Oakland, Portland, Rhode Island (statewide), San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz,
Seattle, Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN) and Washington D.C. Following
list-wise deletion of missing values and other measurement considerations, a final sample
of 77,445 listings is achieved.
The decrease from 232,347 listings to 77,445 listings occurs because of three
criteria. Listings that have been on the site for only a few months are more likely to have
few or no reviews. Thus, the first criterion for inclusion into the analysis is that listings
must be at least one year old. Second, because the Superhost badge was not consistently
on Airbnb until 2015, listings in existence before 2015 were dropped. Third, listings with
prices below $10 and above $10,000 were dropped. Airbnb has these as price limits;
therefore, it is not known why a handful of listings have prices below and above this
range.
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Measurement
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are measures of product performance. In the context of
Airbnb, product performance refers to the performance of a host’s listing for an
accommodation available for rent. Thus, the term “listing performance” is used. This
study measures listing performance in two ways based on the established importance of
product quality and prominence for product performance.
Based on prior research, the first measure of listing performance is captured by
number of reviews. Benítez-Aurioles (2018) uses number of reviews as a proxy for how
many visitors have stayed in a listing. Additionally, Zhang et al. (2018) uses number of
reviews as a stand in for number of bookings when predicting trust towards hosts on
Airbnb. A 2014 meta-analysis examining how online product reviews impact sales
compiled a list of studies measuring retail performance (Floyd et al., 2014). Of the five
studies in the hospitality industry, two use reviews per room as a proxy measure of sales
(Floyd et al., 2014). Across industries, Floyd et al. (2014) note that many studies resort to
using proxy measures of sales. Also, there is a relationship between number of reviews
and room sales, further justifying review volume as a measure of listing performance
(Lee et al., 2015). This is also seen in other parts of the sharing economy, specifically
concerning meal sharing, where number of thank you notes (similar to reviews) is a
predictor of sales performance (Huurne et al., 2018).
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While number of reviews is a suitable proxy, researchers claim this measure
captures the lower bound of number of reviews because not all users leave a review, with
review rates ranging from 30% to 70% as of 2017 (Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Cox, 2019;
Teubner, 2018). Because product performance will be measured by number of reviews,
listings under one year old at the time of scraping have been dropped. This is because,
logically, listings that are new to the site will have fewer reviews than those that have
been around longer. Lastly, number of reviews is log transformed to correct for positive
skewness.
The second measure of listing performance is a listing’s overall rating score.
Rating scores are indicators of a listing’s quality. In a study of P2P lending, borrowers’
past performance helps potential lenders evaluate their reputations (Jie et al., 2019). In
the context of Airbnb, past performance is evaluated by consumer reviews, specifically
rating scores where users evaluate an accommodation’s cleanliness, check-in, and value
(Zhang, 2019). A rating score is a signal of product quality (Taeuscher, 2019) and it is
related to sales performance. Though the product is an extension of the seller, the seller
cannot truly communicate the quality of the product with 100% certainty (Dimoka et al.,
2012). Therefore, consumer reviews exist. Consumers judge the quality of their
experience which implies producer and product performance. Hotel industry studies find
that these consumer ratings positively correlate with online room sales (Ogut & Tas,
2011; Ye et al., 2011). Thus, the rating score is used as the second measure of listing
performance.
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A listing’s overall rating score is provided by Inside Airbnb. This measure goes
from 20 to 100 and is based on the average of a listing’s cleanliness rating, check-in
rating, location rating, accuracy rating, communication rating, and value rating. The
variable corresponds to number of stars and as Teubner (2018) explains, “scores between
≥75 and 84 yield a star rating of 4.0, scores between ≥85 and 94 yield a star rating of 4.5,
and so on” (pg. 267). Due to a heavy left skew, this variable is reverse-coded and log
transformed. This transformed version of the variable replaces the original variable in all
the regression analyses included in this paper.
Independent Variables
The independent variables capture the signals that Airbnb’s producers (hosts)
send to consumers (travelers) to convince them of their reliability and trustworthiness.
These signals include membership length, superhost status, responsiveness, and identity
verification. These signals are consistently used in studies of the Airbnb platform
(Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Moon et al., 2019; Zhao & Rahman, 2019).
Membership length refers to how long a host has been active on Airbnb; a guest
typically sees a phrase like “Joined in 2017” (Airbnb.com). Researchers consistently use
learning theory to propose supported hypotheses concerning the length of membership
and its impact on performance (Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019). This suggests
length of membership should be an important producer signal to when it comes to listing
performance on Airbnb.
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Identity verification lets the consumers know whether producers have provided
and verified a government ID. Overall, Airbnb guests value credibility and dyadic trust
when booking (Moon et al., 2019). There are two studies of Airbnb that address this, one
in a western context and one in a non-western context. Though results are mixed on
whether ID verification is an important producer signal for listing performance (see Xie
& Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019), ID verification is consistently used in studies of
Airbnb that examine how producers’ attributes impact product performance. The signal is
a binary variable, with 1 indicating the host has an ID verification on file, and 0
indicating the opposite. The signal is portrayed on host profiles with a check mark and
the word “verified” (Airbnb.com).
A superhost is a host who has maintained a good reputation on Airbnb according
to Airbnb’s criteria (Airbnb.com). Zhang et al. (2018) finds the superhost badge to be one
of the most important parts of reputation building on the Airbnb platform. Superhosts are
expected to have at least 10 transactions completed, a review rate of at least 50%, a high
response rate, a low cancelation rate, and consistently perform well in reviews (Zhang et
al., 2018). Constructed as a binary variable, the Superhost variable is 1 when the host is a
Superhost, and 0 when not. This signal was not consistently on the platform until midway
through 2014, so listings created before then were dropped.
The responsiveness variable measures how quickly hosts respond to customer
inquiries. In a study of P2P interactions on Airbnb, researchers conclude that guests value
communicative hosts and put high stakes on encounter satisfaction (Moon, et al., 2019).
Thus, host responsiveness is an important communication signal crucial to building trust
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and achieving high listing performance (Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019;
Zhang et al., 2018). For ease of interpretation, the measure is a binary variable, with 1
indicating a host “typically responds within an hour”, and 0 meaning the host takes
longer than one hour to respond..
Moderator Variable
Product risk is hypothesized to be a moderator in the relationship between
producer signals and product performance. In the context of Airbnb, the products are the
different types of accommodation available for rent. This recoded binary variable
considers whether an accommodation is an entire home (1), or a room rental (0). Entire
homes are proxies for low risk products whereas room rentals are proxies for high risk
products. Home listings carry the least amount of risk because consumers rent the entire
apartment or home during their stay and do not come into regular contact with the host or
other tenants. On the other hand, room rentals (private or shared) contain varying levels
of physical risk due to the potential presence of the homeowner and other travelers in the
space (Airbnb.com).
Control Variables
Product attributes are control variables. In the context of Airbnb, these are listing
attributes. When studying Airbnb, Benítez-Aurioles (2018) uses how many guests can be
accommodated, number of bathrooms, and number of bedrooms as control variables that
imply listing size. Researchers doing similar analyses control for number of beds as well
(Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2018). Due to multicollinearity concerns identified
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by high variance inflation factor scores, number of beds is included as the main listing
size attribute with bedrooms, bathrooms, and accommodates left out to increase
parsimoniousness.
Other consistently used controls include price which is log transformed to correct
for positive skewness, and to a lesser extent cancellation and instant booking policies
(Xie & Mao, 2017; Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Teubner, 2018; Zhao & Rahman, 2019). To
ensure accurate analysis, cases with prices below $10 and above $10,000 are dropped.
These are the minimum and maximum prices allowable on Airbnb’s website. Because
some cases had prices at $0 as well as a few over $10,000, I dropped those cases to
ensure accuracy and consistency.
The cancellation policy variable is recoded following the example of Teubner
(2018), who created dummy variables for whether a listing had a flexible, moderate, or
strict cancellation policy. One could view this variable as a reflection of the host’s overall
personality on the platform, but since it is listing specific rather than host specific, it is
treated as a listing attribute. The same could be said for instant booking policy. This
variable measures whether a listing can be booked instantly, without a host’s approval
(Airbnb.com). Lastly, dummy variables are created to represent each of the five United
States regions and due to the inclusion of number of reviews, the age of a listing in years
is controlled for.
Statistical Procedures
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Univariate analyses are produced to provide an overview of the data. Descriptive
statistics can be found below. General Estimating Equations are also used with
adjustments made for clustering to analyze the relationship between producer signals,
product attributes, product type, and product performance. The clustering issue is due to
the ability of hosts to have multiple listings, meaning not all listings are independent of
each other. Three models are estimated for each of the two dependent variables.
Logarithmic transformations are used on both dependent variables to address skewing
issues. Because of this, when results are discussed, effects are presented in percent
change form. To calculate percent change, the following formula is used:
(𝑒𝛽 − 1) ∗ 100
The first model estimates the strength of the relationships between producer signals and
performance. This provides evidence for the importance of signals to the supply side of
P2P platforms and effects and R2 values will be discussed. The second model
incorporates the standard control variables which consist of listing attributes. Finally, a
third model introduces interaction terms and tests the moderating effect of
accommodation type on the relationship between producer signals and performance.
Detailed regression models are found below:
M1: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖

M2: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽5 (𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6 (log (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) +
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𝛽7 (𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽8 (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9 (𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10 (𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝛽11 (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽12 (𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽13 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽14 (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽15 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽16 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝜖

M3: Log(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽5 (𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6 (log (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) +
𝛽7 (𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽8 (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9 (𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10 (𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝛽11 (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽12 (𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽13 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽14 (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽15 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽16 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽17 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽18 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) + 𝛽19 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
𝛽20 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖

M1: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖

M2: : 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽5 (𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6 (log(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) +
𝛽7 (𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽8 (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9 (𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10 (𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝛽11 (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽12 (𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽13 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽14 (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽15 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽16 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝜖

M3: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1 (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1 (𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
𝛽3 (𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽5 (𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6 (log (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) +
𝛽7 (𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽8 (𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9 (𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10 (𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝛽11 (𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽12 (𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽13 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽14 (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽15 (𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽16 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽17 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽18 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) + 𝛽19 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
𝛽20 (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖
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RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the number of reviews is positively
skewed with a mean of 48.81, a standard deviation of 59.84 and ranging from 0 to 612.
About 68% of listings are entire homes and 32% are rooms. For rating score, the average
accommodation has a 95.47 score, with a minimum of 20 and maximum of 100 which is
negatively skewed. The average host has a membership length of 4.33 years. Also, 49%
of hosts are Superhosts, 75% of hosts have the “responds within an hour” message
present on their profile, and 54% of hosts are identity verified. An average listing has
2.17 beds, costs $176.40 per night, and offers 30 amenities. As for the cancellation
policies, 14% of listings have a flexible cancellation policy, 35% have a moderate policy,
and 51% have a strict policy. Additionally, 46% of listings are available for instant
booking. Lastly, the regional split of listings goes as follows: 14% of listings are in the
South, 7% are in the Southwest, 7% are in the Midwest, 43% are on the West Coast, and
29% are on the East Coast.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Number of reviews
Rating Score
Superhost
Membership Length
Identity Verified
Responsiveness
Entire Homes
Beds
Price
Cancellation Policy
Flexible
Moderate

Minimum
0
20
0.27
0
10

Maximum
612
100
11.37
40
10000

Mean*
48.81
95.47
.49
4.33
.54
.75
.68
2.17
176.4

-

-

.14
.35
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Std. Dev.
59.84
5.46
1.87
1.77
259.92
-

Strict
.51
Amenities
1
111
30.45
11.54
Listing Age
1
4.63
2.35
0.97
Instant Booking
.46
Region
South
.14
Southwest
.7
Midwest
.7
West Coast
.43
East Coast
.29
N=77445
*Mean column contains proportion values for categorical variables (Superhost, Identity
Verified, Responsiveness, Entire Homes, Cancellation Policy, Instant Booking, and Region).

Regression Analysis
Regressing Number of Reviews (Product Prominence) on Signals
Due to the large sample size, widespread significance occurs. Therefore, when
presenting results, the effect sizes (shown in percent change) are the focal point. Model 1
in Table 2 estimates the relationship between producer signals alone and performance as
measured by logged number of reviews. Model 1 has an R-squared value of .180 and all
signals are significant at or below the p<.05 level. This suggests producer signals alone
explain 18% of the variance in number of reviews. When controlling for other producer
signals, the presence of the Superhost badge gains hosts 103.40% more reviews than
those without the signal. As for membership, for each year of host membership, number
of reviews falls by 1.98%. Similar to the Superhost badge, the identity verification badge
also has a positive relationship with number of reviews. When host profiles have identity
verification, they receive 13.88% more reviews. Finally, the strongest producer signal is
responsiveness. When a host’s profile indicates that they respond within an hour of
inquiries, their listings are expected to receive 131.64% more reviews than those who do
not.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Logged Number of Reviews on Signals
Model 1
Parameter
Superhost
Membership
Identity Verification
Responsiveness
Beds
Logged Price
Flexible Cancellation
Moderate Cancellation
Amenities
Listing Age
Instant Bookable
East Coast
South
Midwest
Southwest
Entire Home (EH)
EH * Superhost
EH * Membership
EH * Identity Verification
EH * Responsiveness

𝛽
0.71***
-0.02*
0.13***
0.84***

Model 2
SE
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.03

𝛽
0.60***
-0.06***
-0.04
0.71***
0.03***
-0.49***
0.00
0.26***
0.02***
0.44***
0.30***
0.06**
0.07*
-0.01
-0.14***
0.39***

(Intercept)
2.48***
(Scale)
1.43
R2
.18
F
4259.67***
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001
R2 values and F-statistics from OLS equivalent.

3.20***
1.14
.35
2582.67***

Model 3
SE
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.02

𝛽
0.58***
-0.04***
-0.04
0.72***
0.03***
-0.49***
0.00
0.25***
0.02***
0.44***
0.30***
0.06**
0.06*
-0.01
-0.14***
0.50***
0.02
-0.02*
0.00
-0.02

SE
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.05

3.13***
1.14
.35
2068.25***

Model 2 introduces listing attributes into the model and the R-squared value rises
to .35. This suggests that producer signals along with listing attributes account for 35% of
the variance in number of reviews, an improvement of 16 percentage points. For the
Superhost badge, Model 2 still presents a strong positive relationship, but the effect
dropped by 23.23 percentage points from 105.44% to 82.21%. As for membership, the
effect actually grew from the first to the second model. Instead of a decrease of 1.98% for
each year of host membership on Airbnb, listings can expect a decrease of 5.82% for
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each year of membership. Originally a positive effect in Model 1, identity verification
saw a reversal of its effect to negative. Thus, when controlling for listing attributes and
other signals, listings with the identity verification signal receive 3.92% less reviews than
those without it. Finally, similar to the Superhost badge, the impact of responsiveness on
number of reviews remained positive and decreased in effect by almost 30 percentage
points from 131.64% to 103.40%.
The listing attributes in Model 2 are all related to number of reviews in the
expected ways. As number of beds, amenities, and listing age increase by one unit,
number of reviews increase by 3.05%, 2.02%, and 55.27%, respectively. For each percent
increase in price, number of reviews drops by .48%. When a listing has a moderate
cancellation policy compared to a strict policy, it is expected to receive 29.70% more
reviews. When a listing has instant bookings enabled, they are expected to receive
34.99% more reviews than those that do not allow instant bookings. Some regional
variables were also significant. Compared to the West Coast, listings in the South and on
the East Coast receive 7.25% and 6.18% more reviews, respectively. Additionally,
Southwestern listings receive 13.06% fewer reviews than West Coast listings. The
variables for Midwestern region and flexible cancellation policy were not significant.
Finally, when a rental is an entire home as opposed to a room, it receives 47.70% more
reviews.
Model 3 adds interaction between accommodation type and each of the four major
producer signals. This analysis only produces significant interaction between entire homes
and membership. This suggests that the effects of the membership signal differ between
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entire home bookings and room bookings. For entire home bookings, there is a penalty on
the membership signal. This means the negative relationship between membership and
number of reviews is stronger for entire homes than for rooms.
Regressing Rating Score (Product Quality) on Signals
Model 1 in Table 3 estimates the relationship between producer signals and
performance as measured by rating score. Due to a left skew, the rating score measure
was reverse-coded before its logarithmic transformation. Therefore, high rating scores
correspond to poor performance and low rating scores correspond to high performance.
Thus, a decrease in the reverse-coded rating score is associated with an increase in the
pre-transformation rating score.
The model shows that the producer signals alone account for 10% of the variance
in rating score. In this base model, all producer signals are significant. Superhost status is
associated with a higher rating score as the coefficient indicates that Superhost status is
associated with a 60.94% decrease on the reverse-coded rating scale. Membership length
is associated with a 1% decrease on the reverse-coded rating scale for each additional
year, suggesting higher rating scores for longer membership. Identity verification is also
associated with higher rating scores as demonstrated by a 12.19% decrease on the
reverse-coded rating scale. Finally, responsiveness is negatively related to rating score,
with the signal leading to a 68% increase on the reverse-coded rating scale.
Model 2 adds listing attributes and accounts for 16% of the variance in rating
score, a 6-percentage point increase. In the model, all producer signals maintain their
statistical significance. For the Superhost badge, when controlling for other signals and
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listing attributes, its presence is associated with 56.83% decrease on the reverse-coded
rating score, maintaining its association with higher rating scores. For membership, each
additional year a host has been on the platform, the reverse-coded rating score falls by
2.96%. For identity verification, when the signal is present, the reverse-coded rating score
falls by 16.47% and for responsiveness, the reverse-coded rating score increases by
56.83%.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Logged Rating Score on Signals†
Parameter
Superhost
Membership
Identity Verification
Responsiveness
Beds
Logged Price
Flexible Cancellation
Moderate Cancellation
Amenities
Listing Age
Instant Bookable
East Coast
South

Model 1
SE
𝛽
0.02
-0.94***
0.00
-0.01*
0.02
-0.13***
0.02
0.52***

Model 2
𝛽
-0.84***
-0.03***
-0.18***
0.45***
0.08***
-0.47***
-0.34***
-0.18***
-0.01***
0.22***
0.33***
0.17***
-0.30***

Midwest
Southwest
Entire Home (EH)
EH * Superhost
EH * Membership
EH * Identity Verification
EH * Responsiveness

-0.13***
-0.32***
0.29***

(Intercept)
0.90***
(Scale)
2.29
R2
.10
F
2085.51***
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001
R2 values and F-statistics from OLS equivalent.
†: Original score inverted before log transformation.
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2.58***
2.13
.16
935.50***

SE
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02

Model 3
𝛽
-0.84***
-0.04***
-0.16***
0.45***
0.08***
-0.47***
-0.34***
-0.18
-0.01***
0.22***
0.33***
0.17***
-0.30***
-0.13***
-0.32***
0.25***
0.01
0.01
-0.03
0.00
2.61***
2.13
.16
748.62***

SE
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.04

The listing attributes in Model 2 are also worth noting. All attributes are
significant. For each additional bed and additional year a listing has been active, the
reverse-coded rating score increases by 8.32% and 24.61%, respectively, suggesting
lower pre-transformation rating scores for these attributes. For each additional percent
increase in price and each additional amenity, the reverse-coded rating score falls by
.47% and 1%, respectively, suggesting higher pre-transformation rating scores for these
attributes. Also, both flexible and moderate cancellation policies have a positive effect on
pre-transformation rating scores. Concerning the reverse-coded rating score, flexible
policies receive a 28.82% lower score than strict policies and moderate policies receive
16.47% lower score. Additionally, when a listing has instant booking enabled, it receives
a 39.10% higher reverse-coded rating score. Regional variables show that the South,
Midwest, and Southwest listings receive 25.92%. 12.19%, and 27.39% lower reversecoded rating scores than West Coast listings, respectively and East Coast listings receive
18.53% higher reverse-coded rating scores than West Coast listings. When an
accommodation is an entire home, rather than a room rental, it receives a reverse-coded
rating score that is 33.64% higher. Finally, Model 3 adds interaction between
accommodation type and producer signals. The model produces no significant interaction
terms, suggesting no differences in effect for producer signals based on accommodation
type.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study diverges from previous research by considering both product quality
and product prominence as measures of product performance on P2P platforms, and thus
provides a more inclusive and robust assessment of product performance. The central
research questions for this study are: how do platform producers’ reputation signals
contribute to the performance of their products on peer-to-peer platforms and how does
product type moderate the relationship between platform producers’ reputation signals
and product performance? These questions are addressed by investigating two
hypotheses: producer signals have a positive relationship with performance (H1) and
consumers’ physical risk positively moderates the relationship between producer signals
and performance (H2). In this analysis, performance is measured in two ways: product
quality and product prominence. Product prominence is measured through number of
reviews and product quality is measured through rating score. Because of this, separate
models are estimated for each of the performance measures.
Hypothesis one, which states producer signals have a positive relationship with
performance receives mixed support. In the product prominence analysis, the signals in
the base model overall are sufficient correlates of product prominence. However, only
three of four producer signals (Superhost, responsiveness, and identity verification) are
positively related to prominence, while one (membership) is weakly and negatively
related to prominence. One potential explanation for membership length’s negative
relationship could be that hosts that are newer to the platform are doing more to
encourage reviews so that they can build up their reputation. With previously mentioned
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research pointing out review rates range from 30-70%, it is easy to imagine newer hosts
striving for the high end of this range in review completion. Thus, logically, hosts who
have been around longer would be less concerned with number of reviews due to the
higher number of reviews that comes with being active on the platform for a longer
period.
When considering the product attributes, identity verification, originally a positive
correlate, goes negative and loses its significance. This suggests product attributes may
play a large role in determining producer signal usefulness. In the product quality
analysis, all producer signals are significant. One of the producer signals, membership,
has a negative effect. When considering product attributes, the relationships remain the
same.
Overall, these mixed results for hypothesis one suggest most producer signals are
positively related to performance, while certain producer signals may matter for product
performance based on product attributes. The strong influence of product attributes like
cancellation policy and instant booking availability suggest that practical features such as
policies (cancellation, return, warranties, etc.) may be more important to performance
than producer signals like identity verification and membership length. This is consistent
with studies that have shown price, location, instant booking, cancellation policy, and
renting policies to be important correlates of performance (Benetiz-Airoles, 2018;
Guttentag et al., 2018; Jang et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019).
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Hypothesis two, which states that consumers’ privacy risk positively moderates
the relationship between producer signals and performance is weakly supported by only
one of eight interaction terms. The significant interaction present is between membership
length and entire home rentals. The relationship overall is negative, but the penalty is less
for high risk products. When one books a room rather than an entire home, they may face
a higher level of physical risk because they are often sharing spaces with other customers
and even the host (Airbnb). In markets that require trust, the consumer must minimize the
risk of adverse outcomes (Lee et al., 2005). Because room rentals are perceived as riskier
(Lutz & Newlands, 2018), those booking them may rely on membership length as a risk
reduction tool. Thus, this finding supports hypothesis two.
While there is support for hypothesis two, the remaining seven interaction terms
are insignificant. This lack of interaction is in line with an early study by Gregg &
Walczak (2008) which found no support for interaction between producer signals and
product type in a P2P e-commerce context.
While many of this study’s results are mixed, they still draw attention to the
potential impact producer signals can have on the performance of platform producers and
their products on peer-to-peer platforms. This insight is in line with previous studies that
find producers’ characteristics and firms’ e-image influence how consumer evaluate
products and services prior to purchasing them (Gregg & Walczak, 2008; Huurne, M. et
al., 2018). This is evidenced through producer signals’ large impact on performance even
after considering the impact of product attributes like price, location, and policies.
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As with any research, this study has certain limitations. First, related to the
results, causality issues may have caused certain producer signals to be negatively related
to performance. For example, in the product quality model, responsiveness was
negatively related to performance. A potential explanation for this is that hosts who have
low performance are working harder to achieve the responsiveness signal, thus
responsiveness is associated with low performing listings.
Another variable related limitation concern is the Superhost signal. While most
research considers the producer signal while looking at performance in this context, it is
important to note it may have an influence on the model because it is in part achieved
through hitting certain performance metrics that are related to the dependent variables.
Specifically, the Superhost criteria requiring a high review rate, a high response rate, and
high performance in reviews are concerning (Airbnb.com).
Although Airbnb is one of the most popular P2P platforms, these results may
have limited generalizability outside of home sharing platforms. Although this study
assesses both number of reviews and ratings to provide a more comprehensive
assessment than previous studies, measuring performance on P2P platforms with rating
scores and reviews may still be inadequate. Researchers find support for a “don’t-wantto-complain-bias” which suggests the accuracy of performance measures like rating
scores and reviews may be tainted because of social pressure in P2P markets that lead to
fewer negative reviews (Berg et al., 2020).
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Despite these limitations, overall, this research helps extend the P2P platform
literature by providing useful insights to platform owners, producers, and consumers
concerning how both producer- and product-related signals can impact product
performance. Producers on two-sided platforms should be mindful of their performance
on signal measures as well as how they may vary based on the type of product they are
offering. Furthermore, platforms and producers can increase their revenue by embracing
flexibility. This is evidenced through the strong impact of transaction related variables
like cancellation policy and instant booking on product performance in the analysis.
Platform owners and the demand side of platform markets should also invest in
promoting certain types of producer signals. On Airbnb, this study finds that the
Superhost badge was a consistently strong correlate of product performance. Airbnb
invests a lot in this signal and producers must work hard to achieve it. Because of this,
the signal’s visibility and cost are high. Costly and highly visible producer signals are
better quality than cheap and less visible producer signals (Connelly et al., 2011).
Because of this, platform owners should work to create producer signals with high
visibility on their platforms with strict criteria in order to better facilitate transactions.
Responsiveness was another strong correlate of performance, specifically
considering product prominence. This measure, which considers whether a host responds
to accommodation requests within an hour, is important to the booking process. Platform
owners should invest in making communication between the two sides of their markets
easy, quick, and often. Products whose producer communicates quickly with interested
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consumers likely complete more transactions, earning both the platform owner and
producer more income.
This work provides an update to the signaling theory framework and conceptual
models proposed by Xie and Mao (2017) and Zhao and Rahman (2019). This is achieved
by considering the importance of product type as established by research suggesting key
differences in consumers based on product offerings. Specifically, this research proposes
looking at products through the lens of physical risk for consumers. Though the
moderation hypothesis received marginal support, this analysis does lend support to
updating, or at least considering product type when discussing the signaling framework.
While we cannot say that overall higher risk products are more positively impacted by
producer signals than lower risk products, we can conclude that signal performance
varies slightly by product type, as evidenced through the interaction between membership
length and entire homes. Further research on other platforms, products, and signals
should be conducted to lend more support for this assumption. Specifically, studies
utilizing P2P lending platforms, ridesharing platforms, and resource sharing platforms
may provide sufficient evidence that producer signals should be understood as contextand product-specific rather than universal.
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